Representative Zoe Lofgren, a California Democrat, proposed securing meaningful principal write-downs for underwater homeowners by allowing a temporary reduction in the interest rates of those homeowners who file for bankruptcy.

She presented the plan in a letter to President Barack Obama earlier this month and it was discussed by the Democratic lawmakers and FHFA’s acting director Edward DeMarco on Wednesday.

A cramdown is a would-be bankruptcy process whereby a borrower would file bankruptcy, and as part of a reorganization plan, cram a principle reduction of a mortgage down a lenders throat. (Not just a “temporary” reduction in interest, by the way, but a true write down of principal.)

Seems counter-intuitive, doesn’t it?

“Hi, Judge. I’m a bankrupt borrower, but I could afford my house if I owed less, and had to pay less interest. The lender won’t agree. Will you make them, please.”

How does someone who is “bankrupt” afford a house?

It’s simple, in some cases anyway.

The largest debt of a cramdown borrower would be the mortgage. The borrower ** would be ** able to afford the house mortgage ** if ** the mortgage amount was equal to the value of the house – not 125% or 150% of the value of the house. If the interest rate were lower, that would help too.

Who loses in this scenario?

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – those GSEs that hold 75-85% of all mortgages in the US. (Oh, and some private banks that hold the balance. After all, what’s good for the goose…)

Can Freddie and Fannie afford to take the hit? THAT’s the question.

We’ve (as a Country) already dumped 2 TRILLION dollars into the economy. The Government (that’d be you and me by the way) will need to pay for the write offs any cram down allowed. How much more would that be – and where would it come from?

Here’s my $0.02.

The economy limps along like overcooked spaghetti. It’s going nowhere until the banks can get rid of the toxic debt, and consumer confidence rebuilds. Take the losses now, and we can start the recovery sooner. Yes, the losses WILL BE staggering. The bankruptcy courts will be overwhelmed. (I’d bet that some smart folks will start renegotiating those loans without the need for bankruptcy court intervention if the law allowed a borrower to do it through a bankruptcy proceeding – after all, it’d be cheaper for the banks that way…)

But, once the borrowers start paying on their loans again, once borrowers “feel” like they have readjusted on their homes, confidence – i.e. certainty – returns. And with certainty comes spending. With spending comes an uptick in the economy, and the ability for everyone to start making money again. Even he Banks. THAT’s how we pay for the losses Fannie and Freddie will take. We tax our way through it, with the increased economic activity.

Hell no, it’s not pretty. But it could work!

The L.A. Times recently reported that the Fed is now looking to find ways to dispose of the 248,000 homes it owns (through bank REOs) by either selling them in bulk to investors who will be required to rent them, or to sell them on rent-to-own basis.

“One idea could be to create pools of foreclosed properties that would be sold in bulk to private investors, who would then rent them out, helping reduce taxpayer losses on the bailouts of Fannie and Freddie. Another idea could be for investors to buy homes and then rent them on a rent-to-own basis.”

http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/money_co/2011/08/foreclosure-obama-housing-market-rent-fannie-mae-freddie-mac.html

Who is kidding whom here? “Rent-to-Own”? What are we – a mattress store?

The Fed will give a new buyer a break by allowing them to rent, then buy at a price (presumably) fixed at the time they enter into this agreement (thus allowing the buyer to get some upside?) Or, is the program designed to let the Renter buy it at market value several years from now, if they qualify? (That way, the Fed gets the upside, and the rental value. It beats having an empty house…)

Why not just take the mark-down to market value today, and reform the existing loan – and allow the current owner to keep it?

Either way, there is going to be a loss.

The latest and greatest news is that FHA will allow borrowers who are unemployed up to one year of deferred mortgage payment relief (read: live for free) while they get back on their feet.

This represents about 4% of the troubled California mortgages.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac loans are NOT included in this program. Neither are portfolio residential loans held by banks (like all those pesky seconds out there…).

So, for the very few that the “new” program will help (the unemployed, FHA insured, one loan only borrower), congratulations!

For the rest of us: Isn’t it grand how the Government is here to help?

Next.

Strictly speaking…

Defining the qualified residential mortgage (QRM) is testing the mettle of the government’s commitment to stability in the real estate market.

QRMs, established under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), are loans meeting low-risk standards which exempt lenders from having to retain any part of these loans in their portfolios.

New proposals by federal agencies and the administration restrict the designation of QRM to loans in which homebuyers put down at least 20% of the purchase price of a home as down payment, colloquialized as “having skin in the game.”

The proposed down payment requirement alone has sparked fierce debate in real estate circles and the media, but it’s far from the only proposed restriction on what qualifies as a QRM. The designation of QRM is restricted to:

. first-lien mortgages to purchase or refinance a one-to-four unit principal residence;
. mortgages amortizing over 30 years or less;
. borrowers who are not currently 30 or more days past due on any debt;
. borrowers who have not been 60 or more days past due on any debt within the last 24 months;
. borrowers who have not, in the past 36 months:
– filed for bankruptcy;
– had property repossessed or foreclosed on;
– engaged in a short sale or deed-in-lieu of foreclosure; or
– been subject to a federal or state judgment for the collection of a debt;
. loans with interest rates adjusting no more than two percent in any 12-month period, and no more than six percent over the life of the loan, if the loan is an adjustable rate mortgage (ARM);
. mortgages which do not contain prepayment penalties;
. loan-to-value ratios of 70% for rate-and-term refinances and 75% for cash-out refinances;
. debt-to-income ratios of 28% for all mortgage debt, called the front-end ratio, and 36% for all debt, called back-end ratio;
. standard documentation loans;
. loans with points and fees of 3% of the loan amount or less; and
. non-assumable loans.

Any loans not meeting all the above requirements would require lenders and securitizers to hold in reserve an amount equal to 5% of the loan balance in their portfolios, as recovery funds in case of default. This means any borrower who does not qualify for a QRM — i.e., the vast majority of borrowers — would be subject to higher interest rates to cover the increased risk a non-QRM would pose to lenders.

Federal Housing Administration (FHA)- and Veterans Administration (VA)-insured loans, as well as loans sold to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac (while they remain under government control) are not subject to the QRM requirements under the proposal.

If passed, the rules outlined in the proposal will not be implemented until mid-2012.

The zero-sum game lenders will play.

Ah, lenders. The idea of retaining any risk for the loans they originate has them running a bit scared. At this point, we can only speculate on what tricks lenders will devise to get around the rules that borrowers and the rest of the consuming public have to play by — and make no mistake, lenders will do so.

Many of the proposed QRM requirements would set groundwork for a stable housing policy (down payment requirements, strict DTI ratios), separating those who are truly financially able to take on the burden of homeownership from those who are tenants-by-nature. However, it’s important to note the distinction between QRM and a non-QRM are not prohibitive; lenders can still lend to non-QRM-eligible borrowers.

And Americans still have a huge appetite for homeownership in spite of the unmanageable financial risks it poses to most homeowners. A recent study shows Americans are still very willing to glut themselves on housing and mortgage debt, regardless of the financial malaise which follows. Thus, the strict definition of the QRM will only lead to more marginalized types of borrowing — the non-QRM-eligible borrowers will almost certainly be charged higher interest rates, thus perpetuating the cycle of non-QRM-eligible borrowers being more likely to default.

Likewise, the three-year restriction against borrowers who participated in a short sale or deed-in-lieu of foreclosure carries the weight of punitiveness by classification, not ability to pay. Borrowers may have taken it upon themselves to buy (or refinance) when the market value of their properties were worth more than fundamentals dictated, but lenders had no qualms about originating these loans at the time, knowing quite well their conduct was a financial accelerator recklessly driving home prices up. Will restricting short-sale participants from being eligible for a QRM really lead to fewer people overpaying for their homes or defaulting?

Solution or punishment?

The importance of a stable housing policy promoting stable homeownership is paramount, but the strictness of the QRM may be based on reactions to the most recent housing crisis rather than truly crafting a stable housing policy. The strict differentiation between QRMs and non-QRMs merely gives lenders the ability to pawn off their 5% risk-retention onto underqualified homebuyers and homeowners; it’s a zero-sum risk reduction for lenders.

Brokers and agents would do well to be aware of how this proposal fares in the coming months. The proposal is open for comment through June 10, 2011. Comment can be submitted to any of the participating agencies via methods outlined on pages two and three of the proposal, which can be read in its entirety on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)’s website.

From: the first tuesday Journal Online — P.O. Box 20069, Riverside, CA 92516.

Lance Churchull writes:
“One thing I have wondered about in the past is why the two government-sponsored entities, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, found it necessary to have different rules for short sales, but then I remembered that the “G” in GSE stood for government and, of course, the government usually makes things more complicated than they should be. Well, on April 28, 2011, the Federal Housing Financing Agency (FHFA), which has been overseeing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac since their near financial collapse, decided it would be better if they had uniform rules for delinquent mortgages. The FHFA has directed that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac align their guidelines for servicing delinquent mortgages they own or guarantee with the stated purpose of creating an updated framework that will establish uniform servicing requirements for how delinquent mortgages are handled, including the short sale process. The director of FHFA said, “Once fully implemented, the enterprises’ aligned policies will require earlier contact, more frequent communication and prompt decisions.”

The aligned guidelines will also govern the “dual track” foreclosure process by requiring the servicers to immediately contact delinquent borrowers in an effort to resolve a delinquency. The foreclosure process may not commence if the borrower and the servicer are engaged in a good faith effort to solve the delinquency. In the event that the property is referred to foreclosure, financial incentives would be provided to encourage the servicers to help continue the borrowers pursue a foreclosure alternative such as a short sale.

Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae must issue the new guidelines to their servicers on or before September 30, 2011. Having reviewed the actual and very detailed servicing announcements by both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that seems like an awfully long time to implement the new rules. However, given the fact it took Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac eight months to implement a HAFA program that was nearly the same as the Treasury Department’s program, I guess it is reasonable for them to take five months to align their loss mitigation rules.

One of the new policies that agents will like is that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will have the same borrower package for borrowers to be considered for all workout and foreclosure avoidance solutions, including HAMP modifications and short sales. When the borrower’s package is received, it is required that at the beginning of the process there be a simultaneous evaluation of borrowers for both the HAMP and HAFA programs. An additional new standard that agents will applaud is that there will be a uniform case escalation process which requires acknowledgement of an escalation request within three business days after receipt and adherence to a 30-day maximum total time to resolve an escalated case.

Since Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac short sales constitute a large portion of the short sale market, new uniform short sale guidelines and procedures for non-HAFA short sales would certainly be welcomed by the real estate industry. Let’s hope that the new guidelines, when they are issued, will actually simplify and expedite the process, and that the servicers will effectively implement the new rules. Stay tuned for updates on this topic, but don’t hold your breath in anticipation of seeing the newly aligned Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac short sale rules very soon.”

I couldn’t agree more.

According to Fair Issac Company (My FICO) a company that provides analytic, decision making, and credit scoring services for financial service companies a credit score will go down by 40 to 110 points after being 30 days late. Further, the scoring drop will increase to 70 to 135 points after 90 days late on a mortgage payment.

The average scoring drop in a short sale, foreclosure or deed in lieu is 85 to 160 points. You need to keep in mind that in both short sales and foreclosure it is possible that the credit score drop could be closer to 200-300 points.

Credit scoring factors vary from individual to individual. The scoring change is heavily dependent on where the credit score was before the negative event took place. Both a short sale and foreclosure are considered a loan that was not paid as agreed.

You may have heard? The future of FNMA and Freddie Mac is in jeopardy.

These Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSE’s) were originally created to provide a funding source for socially desireable but higher risk loans. When started, GSE’s provided funds for 30% of all loans. Today, that number is 90% — and steps are being taken in Congress to get government out of the lending business or at least scale it back.

Freddie Mac recently published a Memo that starting June 1st, they will no longer purchase loans with loan-to-value ratios of less than 5%. As these GSE’s retract from the marketplace, interest rates and down-payment requirements are likely to rise making home ownership less achievable.

But that’s OK (I guess). I’m sure some smart banker or government type will come up with the new ‘best thing ever’ and create a program to let people who can’t afford a house to buy one anyway. That is, after all, how we got into this mess in the first place.

The Federal Reserve Board has amended Regulation Z, which implements the Truth in Lending Act and Home Ownership Equity Protection Act, with new policies for how loan originators may be compensated.
Effective April 1, 2011, all loan originators will no longer be able to receive compensation based on the interest rate or other loan terms, but instead be compensated based on a percentage of the loan amount.
The final rules protect mortgage borrowers from unfair, abusive, or deceptive lending practices that can arise from loan originator compensation practices.
The final rules, which apply to closed-end loans secured by a borrower’s home, will:
·Prohibit payments to the loan originator that are based on the loan’s interest rate or other terms. Compensation that is based on a fixed percentage of the loan amount is permitted;
·Prohibit a mortgage broker or loan officer from receiving payments directly from a consumer while also receiving compensation from the creditor or another person;
·Prohibit a mortgage broker or loan officer from “steering” a consumer to a lender offering less favorable terms in order to increase the broker’s or loan officer’s compensation; and
·Provide a safe harbor to facilitate compliance with the anti-steering rule.
This policy eliminates yield spread premium as of April 2011, and will be a very significant change to the lending business. There will be a drastic reduction in mortgage broker profitability unless they increase their loan origination fees to cover the change.

Deputy Treasury Secretary Neal Wolin told the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) conference in New York recently that Treasury will not propose housing finance reform measures until 2011, and will probably do so in conjunction with the agency’s enforcement of the new financial reform law just passed by the Senate and due to be signed by President Obama next week.

However, several conference attendees question whether Treasury can implement housing finance reform at the same time it is implementing the most sweeping changes to the country’s finance system since the 1930s.

Both sides of the political aisle endorse the need for reform, especially for crippled lending giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, but no one has yet developed a workable plan that would not inflict more harm on the still-sagging housing market.

Congress continues to be leery of implementing big changes that could upset the economic recovery since Freddie, Fannie and the FHA provide the majority of funding for American homebuyers.

Deputy Treasury Secretary Neal Wolin’s keynote address to the SIFMA conference can be read here.

The FHA warned lenders this week that it is keeping a close eye on how mortgage companies are following the agency’s standards.

And to put teeth into the warning, the FHA announced that it has permanently pulled its approval from two mortgage lenders: RSA Financial, Inc., Atlanta and 1^st Alliance Mortgage LLC of Houston.

From the HUD press release:

HUD’s MRB cited RSA for misleading HUD that it was properly licensed by the Georgia Department of Banking and Finance at the time the company submitted an application to FHA for lender approval. In addition, the MRB alleges that RSA submitted false and/or misleading information regarding the criminal conviction and sanction history of its owner and executive, Ramsey Suphi Agan. HUD claims 1st Alliance engaged in prohibited branch arrangements, provided false certifications, failed to implement a Quality Control Plan, and a number of other violations of HUD/FHA standards.

“If lenders want to do business with the FHA, it’s critical that they provide complete and truthful information so that we can properly determine who we’re dealing with,” said FHA Commissioner David Stevens. “If any lender can’t operate within FHA’s guidelines, they can’t do business with us.”