Harbour owned a ground lease under a condo complex. Julie Nugent purchased a condo and paid her mortgage to Fieldstone Mortgage Company. She also subleased from and paid rent to Harbour. Both the mortgage and the sub-lease were secured by the condo. Nugent eventually defaulted on both her rent and mortgage. After HSBC purchased the condo from Fieldstone at a foreclosure sale, Harbour filed a complaint to quiet title. HSBC failed to respond to the complaint and Harbour obtained a default judgment. HSBC then moved to set aside the default judgment, but the trial court denied the motion. HSBC appealed.

The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment based on the language of California Code of Civil Procedure Section 764.010, which expressly provides that the “court shall not enter judgment by default.” According to the Court, this language “is unequivocal,” and the “prohibition against default judgments in quiet title actions appears absolute.” The statute does not, however, prevent a quiet title plaintiff from taking a default.

Instead of a default judgment, after taking a default, the court must hold an evidentiary hearing at which the parties (including the defaulted defendant) are entitled to present evidence regarding their conflicting claims to the property. Thus, even though HSBC had not answered the complaint and was in default, the trial court should have allowed HSBC to present evidence about its claim to the condo. Once a court holds a properly noticed evidentiary hearing, it may render a regular judgment in accordance with the evidence and the law regardless of whether the defaulted defendant appears.

Here is the fascinating part …

Though a defaulted defendant has a right to appear at the evidentiary hearing, a plaintiff has no obligation to provide notice to the defaulted defendant of this hearing. Nor does the plaintiff have any obligation “to serve documents or give notice of any future court dates” to the defaulted defendant.

If the defaulted defendant nevertheless learns of the evidentiary hearing and appears, it may be heard.

If it does not appear, the Court will proceed and render judgment without the participation of the defaulted defendant. Following the evidentiary hearing, the Court should issue a judgment resolving all issues as to title.

Imagine the HOA’s joy:  It gets a default, then notices the prove-up hearing without the need to even give notice to the other side.  Talk about form over substance.

Other causes of action and claims for relief will not be addressed at this evidentiary hearing and are not affected by this rule. If a defendant defaults as to other claims, normal procedures for obtaining entry of default and default judgment apply.

So did the lenders win?  Or not?  I’d say not.

A borrower stated a claim against a lender for violations of TILA disclosure requirements by alleging that the lender had failed to clearly and conspicuously disclose that payment schedules for an option adjustable rate mortgage (Option ARM) on the borrower’s residence were not based on the actual interest rate, and that negative amortization would occur if the borrower followed the payment schedule provided. The court found that the borrower’s state law claims for aiding and abetting fraud, fraud through misrepresentation in an oral contract, and breach of contract were not preempted by Home Owners’ Loan Act (HOLA), but that HOLA preempted his claim for fraudulent omissions.

More to follow in the next few days.

What impact does the “partially worthless security” exception (Calif. Code of Civil Procedure section 483.010(b)) to the “non-recourse” status of a purchase money loan (see the conjunction of CCP 726(a) and CCP 580b and 580d)?

If the lender can seek a deficiency – or foreclose judicially, even on purchase money, owner occupied, 1-4 unit loans and collect a judgment that isn’t protected by the 726/580 cocktail, because eh security was “partially worthless” – can the lender negotiate from an even stronger position to get more money from a short sale seller?

I’d urge caution…on both sides.

“One idea could be to create pools of foreclosed properties that would be sold in bulk to private investors, who would then rent them out, helping reduce taxpayer losses on the bailouts of Fannie and Freddie. Another idea could be for investors to buy homes and then rent them on a rent-to-own basis.”

http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/money_co/2011/08/foreclosure-obama-housing-market-rent-fannie-mae-freddie-mac.html

Who is kidding whom here? “Rent-to-Own”? What are we – a mattress store?

The Fed will give a new buyer a break by allowing them to rent, then buy at a price (presumably) fixed at the time they enter into this agreement (thus allowing the buyer to get some upside?) Or, is the program designed to let the Renter buy it at market value several years from now, if they qualify? (That way, the Fed gets the upside, and the rental value. It beats having an empty house…)

Why not just take the mark-down to market value today, and reform the existing loan – and allow the current owner to keep it?

Either way, there is going to be a loss.

(Companies are still limited to only $5,000 per claim.)

Why is this important? And why only through 2015 – when the law reverts to the $5,000 level (or maybe the $7,500 level it was also temporarily raised to a few years ago…)?

Beats me.

It might make it interesting for all those borrowers who had “oral promises” from banks not to foreclose – to bring an action in small claims (you know, quick and dirty street justice a’ la Judges Judy or Whapner) for breach of the oral agreements.

That could be fun. And $10k makes it worth while to do – for a filing fee of about $50 bucks (more or less…).

Here is yet another article from first tuesday…

“Fair Issac Company (FICO) researchers have developed new analytics to predict a borrower’s likelihood of walking away from a mortgage – a strategic default – whether or not he is delinquent on his payments. The rise in strategic defaults over the past year is of concern to mortgage lenders. Thus, FICO consulted with them (not underwater homeowners) to develop the analytics with the purpose of preventing strategic defaults and their costly impact on lenders, investors, homeowners and the housing market.

35% of mortgage defaults in September 2010 were strategic, an increase from the 26% more than a year earlier in March 2009 according to a University of Chicago Booth School of Business study. 22.5% of residential mortgage defaults nationwide were strategic in the third quarter of 2010. This number increased to 23.1% in the fourth quarter of the same year.

In negative-equity-laden California, strategic defaults are also widespread (more so than the nation as a whole since California is a nonrecourse state and lenders cannot viably threaten to sue for their losses). There were 45,380 strategic defaults in 2009 – 80 times the number in 2005.

FICO researchers found borrowers who walked away from their mortgages had common traits including:

higher FICO scores;
better credit management (understood financial statements);
less retail balance (did not need credit to buy);
shorter length of residence on the property and thus greater likelihood of a negative equity; and more open credit in the past six months with which to purchase items.

The study concluded the degree of difference in the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio between the current market price for a home and the mortgage owed on the home (home price depreciation) is not as strong of an indicator for predicting a homeowner’s ability or willingness to strategically default. However, the study did conclude a borrower with a stronger history of good money management and a higher credit score tended to strategically default at a higher rate than other borrowers.

FICO and mortgage servicers are alarmed of the increasing frequency of strategic defaulters and warn homeowners of the consequences of walking away from their mortgage payments. Not only will homeowners suffer a 150+ point hit to their credit scores, but they may also face higher rates, tighter terms for other types of credit and a bump in insurance premiums. FICO goes on to implicitly threaten the homeowner who reverts to renting after walking away by saying landlords will be more unwilling to accept them as a tenant when they see a strategic default on the tenant’s credit record.

This is a fabrication of the worst type. FICO and the lenders they consulted with (who incidentally are the ones who pay FICO for the use of their algorithms) have an economic interest in keeping California’s population of negative equity homeowners imprisoned in their underwater homes. The truth is, any landlord fully understands that a strategic defaulter is going to make a very fine, long-term tenant if they have a job and otherwise pay their bills – and most all do since they made the sound decision to strategically default.

Walking away is for smart people, and lenders know it.

Several studies over the past years have already observed strategic defaulters tend to hail from a more financially savvy crop of people. The recent FICO study repeats this conclusion of which many of us are familiar.

What it also advertises — to the endorsement of lenders — are the detrimental effects of walking away from a mortgage. Agents and brokers must construct the bigger picture, especially in California where underwater homeowners collectively hold over 2,000,000 negative equity mortgages.

California negative equity homeowners have the short end of the stick with black-hole assets on their hands, so the question they should be answering is not whether a strategic default would be a in the best interest of their lenders. Rather, they should be considering whether a strategic default would be a prudent choice for their personal financial situation.

It’s true, homeowners will see a hit to their credit scores from a strategic default — and of course FICO will highlight this since the media often overstates this figure — but homeowners must not be inveigled into staying in negative equity properties by the vague economic threat of a lower FICO score. It’s not about the FICO score alone, but the costs versus benefits analysis of the homeowner’s individual situation.

Either a homeowner can continue to siphon his money into a dead-end loan, or he can save that money and invest it into a much more lively investment — improving his family’s standard of living.

Paying lenders the full amount on an underwater home is not what is going to fuel the recovery of a family or the California economy — what we need is to put cash in the hands of negative equity Californians.

A strategic default when the LTV is above 125% is not a dishonest financial bailout – it is prudent business decision. It may temporarily hurt the pride and credit scores of California homeowners, but these things are soon remedied.

Paying lenders the full amount on an underwater home is not what is going to fuel the recovery of a family or the California economy — what we need is to put cash in the hands of negative equity Californians. If they aren’t going to get any cramdowns in bankruptcy courts, they need to exercise their legal right to strategically default — that “put option” in every trust deed. Besides, it’s what all the smart people are doing anyway, right?

Copyright © 2011 by first tuesday Realty Publications, Inc. Readers are encouraged to reprint or distribute this information with credit given to the first tuesday Journal Online — P.O. Box 20069, Riverside, CA 92516.”

first tuesday agrees.
“If mortgage lenders will not lend homeowners a hand, then homeowners can force lenders’ hands by exercising their right to default, made imperative by a loan-to-value ratio (LTV) above 125%. Waiting for a modification that isn’t available just isn’t the best bet for a homeowner or for California’s economy. And don’t listen to the preaching on the effect on how a strategic default is better or worse for Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO) credit scores – a short sale delivers the same amount of adverse credit scoring as does a foreclosure. ”

Couldn’t have said it better myself.

 This year the Legislature passed Senate Bill 458 which amended Section 580e by making it applicable to junior liens as well.  It also applied additional limitations to the loans subject to the section. In addition to not being able to get a deficiency judgment it provides at Section (a)(1) that after a short sale no deficiency shall be owed or collected and no deficiency judgment shall be requested or rendered provided the short sale closed escrow and the lender was paid the amount they agreed to accept.

 Although the law does not specifically say so it is likely the courts will interpret that section to mean that it applies to a short sale closing either before or after July 15, 2011, the effective date of the new section.  That analysis is based on the provision that the short money cannot be collected and no deficiency can be requested.  It also will bar lenders from turning these loans over to a collection company which some lenders were doing even though the earlier section barred a deficiency judgment.

 The amended law provides at Section (b) that the holder of a note shall not require the seller to pay any additional compensation, aside from the proceeds of the sale, in exchange for their consent to the short sale.

 Some people have taken the position that, since only the seller is prohibited from providing additional compensation, the 2^nd lender can request the buyer or real estate brokers to pay them additional money above that the 1^st has agreed they can receive from the sale. 

 That might be true if only this code section applied.  But if the 1^st lender has based their approval on their consent to the 2^nd only receiving a specified amount then any attempt to pay the 2^nd more without the consent of the 1^st would likely be considered loan fraud.  If the 1^st finds there is more money available in the transaction they will rightly feel it should go to them rather than to the 2^nd.  That is the purpose of being in 1^st position.

Section 580e (c) provides that if the borrower commits loan fraud the limitations of the section would not apply.  The lender would then be able to pursue the entire unpaid balance. If you are the broker in a transaction where the 2^nd lender requests the broker or buyer to pay them some additional money either within or outside escrow you need to make sure that either the 1^st lender specifically approves the additional money being paid to the 2^nd or you run away from that transaction as quickly as possible.  Participating in a fraudulent transaction can expose you to monetary liability to the lender, revocation of your license by DRE and criminal prosecution.

The real question remaining to be answered is whether this new law will be a great protection of the seller from liability after a short sale or whether it will lead to lenders denying short sales in favor of pursuing foreclosure where a deficiency by a junior lien holder may be possible.

If you have any questions on this article or any other aspect of real estate law please contact the Hanson Law Firm at 916 447-9181 or log on to our website at www.HansonLawFirm.com.

From a legal perspective, it gets worse, especially when “Joy” or “Nancy” tells you one thing (like, “You’re approved for our internal Loan Modification Program…”) but refuses to put it in writing. Or the letter you get says something different than the Bank’s representative said on the phone.

What do you do to protect yourself?

Try this:

When someone from the Bank calls, tell them: “I am recording this call for LEGAL purposes. Please state your full name and your birthdate – for identification purposes.”

How much you wanna bet the call will end – right there?

It will. And that’s OK.

If the Bank representative won’t agree to be recorded – END THE CALL. Nothing that is said in it will will matter anyway. The Bank will change its position. And you won’t be able to prove a thing. (And having the Bank’s representative refuse to be recorded, can work to your advantage later in court…)

Oh, and when Joy or Nancy balks, remind her that the Bank is recording the call already. For “training purposes.”